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Because Pascal's Pensees is a labyrinth of puzzling 
and provocative observations often difficult to place 
within the mainstream of seventeenth century 
philosophy, it has often been relegated to a secondary 
status by historians concerned with the period. 
Recently the work's abrupt and discontinuous character 
as a loose collection of more or less developed 
thoughts—a feature which has frustrated many minds 
more accustomed to the flow of the writing of a 
Descartes or a Hobbes—has attracted the attention of 
writers such as Foucault and deconstructionist 
historians of literary criticism such as Paul deMan and 
Jacques Derrida. More sympathetic to the 
characteristics of dialectic tension in thinkers like 
Pascal and Nietzsche, deMan, Foucault, Derrida, and 
others infuse their analyses of philosophic works with 
a strong concentration on how rhetorical and semiotic 
features contribute to the understanding of the works 
as communicative contexts out of which meaning emerges. 
Pascal and Nietzsche are favorites for such an 
approach, in that the forms of the pensee or the 
aphorism invite repeated return and reinterpretation 
due to their terse and often paradoxical tenor; such 
forms also emphasize the discontinuities and 
disruptions of thought implicit not only in the 
recurrent generation of new meanings in new readings of 
the texts but also in the author's presentation of the 
movement of thought as a sometimes halting, sometimes 
cryptic and unsettling process. 
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As his subtitle indicates, Hugh Davidson approaches 
the question of certainty in the Pensees on two 
different methodological levels: one in which the more 
traditional philosophic theme of the means to attain 
certainty are discussed, and the other in which the 
complexes of Pascal's words, terms, and meanings 
surrounding the issue of certainty are examined in 
order to "glimpse through the underlying mental states 
and tensions that give rise to the text." This second 
methodological interest serves as the point of unity 
between Davidson's work and that of others also 
interested in literary criticism. 
Davidson's intention is to inquire into the 
function and meaning of the notion of proof in the 
Pensees in an attempt to show how Pascal uses four 
types of proof (geometric, syllogistic, dialectic, and 
pragmatic) to provide the means to a faith in God which 
cannot be doubted. According to Davidson, such a 
treatment of proof—encompassing as it does a process 
of growth in conviction for man seen as a practical-
religious-reasoning unity and not simply limited to the 
demonstrations of reason alone—serves to explain 
Pascal's views on the means by which (1) reason opens 
the mind up to the more humanly integrating types of 
proofs, (2) custom or habit strengthens one's 
attachment to these proofs, and (3) inspiration brings 
true conviction not only in the existence of God but 
more importantly in the unified relationship of God, 
man, and Nature as a context in which rational 
certainty and faith gain meaning. Within 6uch a 
description, Davidson is able to point out how Pascal's 
famous wager is nether a beginning of a convincing 
proof in God nor an end reluctantly accepted because of 
the inability to provide a rational proof. Instead, 
the wager is seen to be a part of a complete convincing 
process—a process which begins with the non-
exclusionary activity of reason and which is made 
stable through practice and custom and provided with 
the hope-filled immediacy sought after by men as 
passional, spiritual, as well as rational beings. 
Pascal is a difficult writer to try to describe in 
ways other than his own, and Davidson avoids the 
pitfalls of a systematic or discursive treatment by 
adopting the sometimes sporadic way of writing found in 
his author. We bounce with Davidson, as we do with 
Pascal, from one pensee to another, forced to rely on 
our own sense of direction to get us over the 
discontinuities in Davidson's as well as Pascal's 
prose. Certainly this is not a book for those 
unwilling to attempt to penetrate the mental states and 
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tensions that give rise to Davidson's text or those 
unable to grapple with Pascal's own terseness (the 
numerous quotations from Pascal are in French without 
translations). As with any attempt to make Pascal more 
accessible, Davidson has to try to present Pascal in 
terms of a clarifying continuity where Pascal pulls us 
constantly back to the insistence of cognitive and 
linguistic disruption. For his part, Davidson keeps us 
within the Pascalian mind and way of writing and thus 
requires from the beginning a reader sympathetic to and 
willing to struggle with Pascal. 
Spring Hill College 
